--Abstract --Taking a fresh look at the European Monetary System and its institutional successor, Europe's newly-inaugurated monetary union, this paper asks whether power asymmetries and the "threat" of domestic political turnover might be influencing the types of international institutions and dispute resolution structures we see emerging across today's international landscape. Perhaps the most striking feature of these new arrangements is their flexibility; most leave considerable room for ex post changes in the initial terms of cooperation. That this is so-and the EMS, whose rules explicitly allowed for periodic parity realignments, is a case in point-presents something of a mystery. Why don't the creators of these arrangements fully specify their terms of cooperation ex ante? By allowing for subsequent revisions or "clarifications" over time, these actors would seem to be increasing, rather than diminishing, their regime's susceptibility to unwarranted defections. The standard explanation is that the creators, being boundedly rational, are unable to devise a complete contract. But this is not, I contend, the only possibility. From a political standpoint, an incomplete regime may actually be preferable. By fleshing out the terms of cooperation ahead of time, the creators would be denying future opponents of the regime (who might one day include the initial prime movers' own domestic successors) any opportunity to moderate its terms, reformulating-or simply reinterpreting-them in ways intended to make their continued participation in the arrangement somewhat less burdensome than it would otherwise be. It is for this reason, I suggest, rather than out of the (narrowly construed) efficiency considerations emphasized by previous scholars, that the contractual terms embodied in many of today's regional and multilateral institutions take the looser forms they do. Delimited though it is, this flexibility works to co-opt the regime's "losers," reducing their propensity to mount a serious challenge to it if, in future years, they should ever get the opportunity. would like to suggest. It's just that the work of clarifying that contribution, of explaining precisely how power considerations enter into the institutional design calculus, has yet to be done. This paper endeavors to fill that gap.
At the center of my analysis are the "enactors." These are the pivotal founding members a new regime, the ones whose ex ante power positions are the strongest. Why are their positions the strongest? One possibility is that the non-cooperative status quo is not as unappealing to them as it is to their counterparts and so, having less to lose, they can hold out longer for their first-choice institutional structures.
3 Alternatively, the bargaining advantage enjoyed by the enactors may owe less to their being (relatively) content with the status quo than to the fact that they have the ability to shift that status quo-by "going it alone"-should other aspiring regime participants refuse to grant them the structures they want. 4 Either way, the point is that the institutional preferences of some participants in the regime-building process may count for considerably more than those held by other participants. If our goal is to understand why the institutions that emerge from this process take the particular forms they do, our first step must be to inquire into the strategic calculations and incentives of these more powerful players. What kinds of problems are they likely to be worried about, and to try as best they can to preempt or mitigate, as they go about the task of designing "their" regimes?
Drawing upon the new economics of organization (see esp. Williamson 1985) , one might expect two such problems to loom particularly large. The first is the risk of ex post opportunism, referred to below as the incomplete contracting problem.
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The second is the risk of ex ante 3 Cf. Rubinstein 1982. 4 See Gruber 2000. 5 As I explain below, the incidence of ex post defections is likely to be particularly high when the terms of the contract or agreement at issue are incomplete and therefore fundamentally ambiguous. coordination failure, or what might be called the multiple equilibria problem. 6 There is, however, a third category of institutional design problems which, though less familiar to students of international cooperation, may loom even larger in the minds of the pivotal players. These problems-the nature and implications of which I focus on in this paper-stem precisely from the "power-politics" fact that few international agreements benefit all of their signatories equally. The same could be said of domestic agreements of course, or, for that matter, of any contract whose signatories wish it to endure for more than a very short period of time; rarely do long-term transactional relationships benefit each party by exactly the same amount. Yet the fact that there are relative losers in most long-term international relationships holds a special significance, for the relative winners (including the prime movers whose idea it was to establish these relationships in the first place) do not have the luxury of appealing to a higher body in the event that their partners-the relative losers-decide to radically overhaul the structure of the arrangement.
True, the losers' incentives to engage in this sort of behavior may not be very strong at the outset of the cooperation process. Although their own expected benefits may not be as great as those anticipated by the winners, the losers would still be better off abiding by the terms of the new regime (their relative losses notwithstanding) than not abiding by them-at least initially. Over time,
however, that could change, for there is always a chance that a government presiding over one of the regime's relatively disadvantaged member states could be turned out of office and replaced by a less cooperative political party or coalition, one whose leaders see the terms embodied in the regime as producing not just relative losses but also absolute losses. Even if it decided to stay in the regime, 6 I do not mean to suggest that these are the only problems with which the new economics of organization is concerned. To date, however, I think it is fair to say that this literature-particularly as it has been applied by students of international relations-has given opportunism and coordination problems the lion's share of attention (as opposed, say, to the problem of variable tastes or preferences). For a more nuanced treatment, see Furubotn and Richter 1997. this "new kid on the block" would be in a position to wreak havoc, demanding full-scale changes in the rules of the game that its predecessor, along with all of the other founding members of the arrangement, had previously agreed to uphold. The original enactors would not be required to adopt those changes, of course. But by the time the threat surfaced, the once-powerful enacting coalition might find that its earlier position of dominance had greatly deteriorated. While this deterioration could occur in many different ways and for any number of different reasons, the most likely scenario-and certainly the most dramatic-would involve one of the enacting governments being forced to step down after a pivotal national election or (even more dramatically) following a violent coup d'état. Should something like this ever happen-if even one of the enacting governments were to be succeeded in office at some point in the future by an anti-cooperation party or coalition-the regime in question would be rendered particularly vulnerable, as would all of those future benefit streams anticipated by the signatories who had been profiting from it and who, like the enactors who created it, wished to see it survive.
That being the case, one would expect this scenario to weigh quite heavily on the minds of the enactors during the initial period, as they considered the relative pros and cons of different institutional configurations. Might it weigh even heavier than the opportunism and coordination problems emphasized by previous IPE scholars? I think it could, though the answer would ultimately depend on the particularities of the case (e.g., the extent to which the enacting governments could feel confident that parties sharing their pro-cooperation views, if not necessarily they themselves, would remain in power for the foreseeable future). Suffice it to say that the powerpolitics side of the institutional design story deserves closer scrutiny than it has received thus far in the IPE literature. My hope is that by bringing these issues to the surface, this paper will point the way toward a broader, and ultimately more productive, institutionalist perspective.
The paper is organized into five sections. I begin in section 1 by taking a brief look at what the IPE community has had to say about recent institutional developments, and about the politics of institutional choice more generally. In section 2, I then put forward my own perspective, one that flows directly out of the theoretical logic I have begun fleshing out in this introductory section. Thus I ask how the knowledge that a multilateral regime may one day include a preponderance of members who do not believe they are benefiting from it 7 should be expected to influence the decision making of the initial prime movers, the coalition of actors who, by virtue of their more powerful positions,
can essentially dictate what form the regime takes. Might the threat posed by these (future) losers incline the original enactors toward more flexible-and hence more elaborate-institutional structures than they might otherwise want or prefer? And if so, just how flexible must these structures be? In short, how might the choices of the prime movers be altered by the realization that the cooperative arrangements they are about to inaugurate will engender strong opposition, if not immediately then at some point after they, these arrangements' primary beneficiaries, have lost power domestically?
The remainder of the paper uses my answers to these questions to shed new light on the origins and structures of the European Monetary System (EMS) and its institutional successor, Europe's new monetary union. In section 3, the French left is singled out as the enemy of the EMS most likely to bring about its demise. It was not, in other words, an external enemy-Britain's anti-EMS Tories, for example-that most concerned the regime's Franco-German enacting coalition. It was an internal enemy-namely, France's newly-resurgent Socialist party. Having identified the Socialists as the EMS loser whose potential to wreak havoc was of greatest concern to the regime's 7 Or who, while not necessarily favoring a return to the non-cooperative status quo, nonetheless feel strongly that the terms of cooperation ought to be revised in a direction more conducive to their own interests.
French and German enactors, I then show how these concerns can help us make sense of the latters' otherwise perplexing institutional choices. Had it not been for the growing threat posed by the Socialists, France's conservative president and his German counterpart would never have created the open-ended and inclusive monetary structure with which, in 1978, they endowed "their" EMS. After a brief discussion of European monetary unification in section 4, the paper concludes.
Rationalist Perspectives on Supranational Governance
Like other proponents of the new institutionalism, neoliberal theorists of international relations see the process of institutional choice as being guided primarily by efficiency considerations, with groups of actors (here, states or governments) struggling to choose whichever institutional forms will enable them most effectively to respond to market failures, mitigate collective-action problems, and generally further their common interests. 8 This line of analysis begins with the observation that certain policy objectives-even seemingly "domestic" ones like generating economic prosperity-are difficult for nations to achieve on their own. From this it is but a short step to the conclusion that, by acting in concert, national governments can significantly improve their collective welfare; if all make the necessary behavioral adjustments, all benefit. While these behavioral adjustments might not look so beneficial to outsiders, for those on the inside-for the cooperators themselves-the move to a coordinated outcome is assumed to afford Paretoimproving gains, leaving all of them at least as well off as they were under the previous, noncooperative status quo.
So far, so good. The problems come when cooperation fails to emerge spontaneously. Just as the fear of being exploited prevents the two prisoners in the prisoners' dilemma from cooperating to lighten their sentences, so too, neoliberals argue, the fear of exploitation can prevent groups of nations from coordinating their policies in ways that could leave each of them unambiguously better off. To be sure, any nation that anticipated being "suckered" could threaten to retaliate against its partners should the envisaged cooperative gains fail to materialize. In principle, then, the expectation of future reprisals and loss of reputation could itself be sufficient to keep everyone in line. 9 That's the good news. The bad news is that this Axelrodian path to cooperation can work only if each partner is able to distinguish the opportunistic behavior it seeks to deter from the cooperative behavior it wishes to encourage. This is where formal institutions enter the story.
The Information Argument
Of all those institutional functions that neoliberal theorists have identified as having a salutary effect on the prospects for cooperation, those involving the collection and distribution of information are usually considered to be the most important. 10 Why? Because it is only when actors are able to distinguish cheaters from cooperators that they can be expected to dole out punishments (to opportunists) and rewards (to fellow cooperators) appropriately.
It is fair to say that Axelrod initially underestimated the importance of these informational requirements. After conceding that "recognition and recall" are both critical to the success of collective action, his book The Evolution of Cooperation quickly dismisses their practical significance, noting that the informational demands of strategies like tit-for-tat, which "respond only to the recent behavior of the other player," are so limited that even bacteria can fulfill them. "And if bacteria can play games," writes Axelrod (1984, 174) , "so can people and nations." But while its informational requirements may be low compared to those of other strategies, even tit-for-tat 9 Axelrod 1984. See also Taylor 1987. 10 See particularly Chayes and Chayes 1993; Keohane 1984; and Mitchell 1994. requires the players who deploy it to be able to determine whether their partners have cooperated or defected in their most recent move of the game. This might not be difficult for bacteria, but for people and nations it can be quite a complicated matter. In fact, virtually all transactions between human agents entail some degree of privately held information.
That said, imperfect (or asymmetric) information is likely to pose a greater impediment in some situations than in others. In multiplayer games, for example, there is always a chance that one player will misinterpret defection by a second player as cheating when in fact the second player is merely retaliating against a third player for committing an unwarranted defection in a previous round. 11 And similar difficulties could arise in a strictly bilateral interaction. Suppose, for example, that effective control over the policy realm in question were to change hands within one of the parties to a bilateral agreement at some point after the game had commenced. In that event, the other party might find itself lacking vital information about how its new transaction partner had behaved in its prior dealings, and thus whether that new partner was likely to prove as reliable a cooperator as its domestic predecessors had been before their ouster.
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Enter institutions. In "noisy" environments like these, neoliberals suggest that international institutions can play a useful role in formalizing the initial terms of cooperation, monitoring subsequent behavior, and efficiently transmitting information about each party's past and present records of compliance. The upshot is that where international institutions exist and operate as intended-keeping each member state apprised of how its partners are behaving and, should there be 11 Bendor 1987; cf. Oye 1986, 18-20. 12 Downs and Rocke (1995) discuss some of the strategies that mutual-gains-seeking cooperators might use to surmount this particular source of uncertainty. Section 2 below offers further analysis of the relationship between domestic politics and the formation of international institutions, a topic which, as Downs and Rocke correctly note, does not fit comfortably within the unitary-actor framework of most international relations theory.
an unwarranted defection, clearing up any ambiguity about the identity of the true culpritsinternational cooperation may not in fact be so difficult to achieve (or to sustain) after all.
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At first blush, this perspective would seem sufficient to account for the remarkable institutional developments of recent years. Delve beneath the surface, however, and the standard account quickly runs into problems. For even if one accepts the basic thrust of neoliberal institutionalist theory-that institutions facilitate collective gains by helping states overcome obstacles to cooperation-the powers delegated to today's international institutions often go well beyond what many of the theory's original proponents had in mind.
14 The remainder of this first section tells the story of how some scholars, sympathetic to the logical structure and normative thrust of neoliberal theory yet disappointed by its inability to account for the rise of full-blown supranational governance structures, went in search of new theoretical tools.
The Incomplete Contracting Argument
Recognition of the yawning gap between (neoliberal) theory and reality has led in recent years to an exciting new round of theoretical innovations and refinements.
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Often using the European Union as a reference point, contributors to this body of work draw extensively upon economic theories of hierarchy, organization, and firm structure, none of which take the institutional requirements for cooperation to be as easily satisfied as earlier IPE scholars had envisaged. True, institutional agents may well be necessary to perform the tasks of monitoring compliance and identifying defectors. But as long as each cooperation partner is clear about what is permitted and forbidden, these tasks can be carried out fairly easily. To proponents of the new economics of organization, the real challenge lies in ensuring that the partners really are clear about what is permitted and forbidden-and at all times, not just at the beginning of the process.
16
In international relations, questions about what it means to cooperate or defect are endemic.
In part, this is because the individuals who negotiate international agreements are often guided by time-sensitive domestic political concerns, and so rush into deals without taking the time to set forth their terms as carefully as might be the case in less political environments. But some degree of imprecision or incompleteness is inherent in all agreements, at least all those intended to endure for more than a very short length of time. In a world of rapid political, economic, and technological change, it's simply not possible to determine ahead of time which types of conflicts and questions will arise over the lifetime of a long-term contractual relationship between two states. And even if it were, the contracting parties (i.e., the individuals who preside over the governments of these states)
would not necessarily have the information, let alone the time, to specify appropriate responses for each one. Before deciding on an appropriate response, these parties would first have to consider whether the particular rule violation in question was the product of deliberate malfeasance rather than an inadvertent, and thus innocent, misreading of their agreement. Only in the former case-and perhaps not even then-would retaliation against the defector be warranted. Lacking any 16 Cf. Kreps 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; and especially Williamson 1985. independent authority, neoliberalism's watchdog agencies would be unable to render such distinctions, leaving the door open for each party to the agreement to read its (ambiguous) provisions as it pleased.
Alternatively, the parties to an international pact or treaty could agree ahead of time that a particular set of collective decision-making procedures would be followed whenever a dispute over a particular clause or provision in the agreement needed adjudicating. Otherwise, an unstructured and open-ended-hence time-consuming-bargaining process would be necessary each time there arose a new set of circumstances not explicitly covered by the unavoidably indeterminate language of the agreement. In the course of trying to resolve these contractual ambiguities to everyone's satisfaction, international cooperation could quickly devolve into chaos.
The Multiple Equilibria Argument
Although the analytics and implications of the prisoners' dilemma continue to fascinate theoretically-oriented students of international cooperation, the last several years have seen the theoretical spotlight shift toward the related but analytically distinct coordination dilemma.
Historically, much of the controversy between neoliberals and realists has centered around the issue of enforcement, with neoliberals proposing-and realists disputing-various solutions to the problem. That the problem of enforcement emerged as a hot topic of debate was perfectly natural, for international cooperation is possible only insofar as the parties involved trust each other to keep their promises. Strictly speaking, however, the types of difficulties that arise in trying to ensure that all parties do in fact follow through are second-order problems. The initial problem is getting a group of would-be cooperators to make these promises in the first place. Why, in practice, might this prove to be a major hurdle?
One reason may be that some parties to the negotiations believe their future cooperation partners would reap a disproportionate share of any ensuing joint gains. 17 The world envisioned by many realists is one in which these kinds of relative-gains concerns are both serious and pervasive, and in which (as a result) security-conscious states encounter few opportunities for mutually beneficial deal making. Yet careful analysis of the coordination dilemmas highlighted in work by
Stephen Krasner (1991) and others raises a different possibility: perhaps reaching agreement is difficult because states encounter too many, not too few, opportunities for collective gain.
Having belatedly come to appreciate the potential seriousness of this "multiple equilibria"
impediment to cooperation, scholars of international relations are now moving energetically to explore its implications for supranational governance. Might supranational arrangements foster collectively desirable outcomes by limiting the number of potential equilibria? According to some analysts, institutions provide focal points along the lines previously suggested by Thomas
Schelling. 18 Common sense suggests that this focusing role would be of greatest importance in situations similar to the battle-of-the-sexes-type scenario discussed in Krasner's 1991 study, in which the underlying preferences of each would-be cooperator differ. 19 Yet even if what these actors confronted were a "pure" coordination dilemma, it is still possible that they would be better off ceding agenda-setting powers-that is, the right to designate the initial terms of agreement-to a third party.
The point is sometimes illustrated with reference to the agenda-setting powers exercised by the European Commission, most transparently during negotiations over the landmark Single European Act of 1986. By the mid-1980s, all twelve member states of the European Community 17 Grieco 1990.
18 Schelling 1960, esp. chap. 4; cf. Young 1994, 110-11. 19 Krasner 1991, 339-42 . See also Martin 1992; Garrett and Weingast 1993; Morrow 1994; and Fearon 1998. had recognized the importance of reinvigorating the integration process. Attitudes about what the "new" EC should look like nonetheless varied from one government to the next. On some accounts, it was in order to ensure that their competing visions would not prevent the process of integration from moving forward that Thatcher, Kohl, and other European leaders allowed the commission to dictate the integration agenda. 20 The result, thanks in large measure to the catalyzing effects of the commission's detailed directive on the internal market (the 1985 White Paper), was a pro-integration agreement that, while pleasing no one perfectly, was better than ceaseless intergovernmental wrangling and no agreement at all.
Broadening the Debate: The "Power Politics" of Institutional Design
The interweaving of neoliberal theory and the new economics of organization is a relatively recent phenomenon, and as with all research endeavors in their early stages of development, a good deal of work remains to be done. Yet while most contributors to the literature see their task as one of deepening the paradigm and refining its core logic, the task of broadening the argument is, in my view, at least as important. To that end, this section asks what would happen if the actors who set the cooperation bandwagon in motion had the capacity to impose their own institutional choices on other actors in the system. In this scenario, the governments in the enacting coalition are in the driver's seat, and everyone else is presented with a fait accompli.
The Importance (to the Enactors) of Insulating the New Equilibrium
For the sake of argument, let's assume that the enactors are in fact able to present their neighbors with a fait accompli-a set of institutional arrangements the latter will have to accept lest, in holding out for the institutions they themselves prefer, they end up being shut out of the 20 See, e.g., Cameron 1992; Garrett 1992; and Pollack 1997. cooperation process altogether. Now the theoretical task becomes one of explaining why, despite their holding a dominant position, the actors who make up the enacting coalition might want to do their bidding through governance structures that afford these neighboring states (i.e., the relative losers) some role, however institutionally delimited or circumscribed, in determining how unforeseen circumstances and conflicts would be dealt with. By doing this-granting their regime's relatively disadvantaged signatories some scope to mitigate their losses-the members of the enacting coalition would seem more likely to diminish than to enhance their own gains from cooperation. And the truth is that the relative losers would have participated in the regime anyway, since doing so would still leave them better off (albeit not as much better off) with respect to the status quo.
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Imagine, however, that one of enacting coalition's relatively disadvantaged partners were to be suddenly turned out of office by a political party whose leaders were much less approving of the cooperative arrangement they had inherited. Or, to take it one step further, imagine that one of the enactors themselves were to be ousted from office and succeeded by an anti-cooperation party or coalition. In either of these cases-but especially in the latter-the original group of enactors would have a serious problem on their hands. For these (new) regime losers might well conclude that their continuing participation in the arrangement would leave them absolutely, not just relatively, worse off, and that their best course of action under the circumstances would thus be to withdraw from the regime altogether-or to use the threat of doing so as a means of forcing the regime's other members to dramatically restructure its internal design and operation.
Could the enactors really be pushed around in this fashion? Not as long as they retained their earlier positions of dominance. But, as noted earlier, the power initially enjoyed by the enacting coalition would always be somewhat tenuous; the enactors are merely governments, after all, and 21 But see Gruber 2000.
governments do not last forever. Nor would any of the original enactors be able to appeal to a higher international body-a world court, for instance-in the event that "their" regime was to be taken from them and reengineered to serve a set of objectives that they themselves did not fully support.
To be sure, tampering with the enactors' regime would not be an entirely costless activity, and the enactors could be counted upon to try to make these costs-the price their anti-regime opponents would pay were they to exercise their "exit options"-as high as possible. Below I suggest a few ways the enactors might go about this. For now, though, I want to emphasize the flipside of the enactors' problem, which, from an institutional design standpoint, is the more important.
For just as the prime movers would have a stake in raising the penalty for opting out of their regime, so, too, would they have an interest in reducing their successors' costs of staying in the regime.
This suggests a quite different explanation for the "incompleteness" we observe in so many cooperative interstate arrangements. Why don't the creators of these arrangements fully specify their terms of cooperation ex ante? The standard explanation is that the creators, being boundedly rational, are unable to devise a complete contract. But this is not, I have argued, the only possibility. From a political standpoint, an incomplete regime may actually be preferable. By fleshing out the terms of cooperation ahead of time, the creators would be denying future opponents of the regime (who might one day include the initial prime movers' own domestic successors) any opportunity to moderate its terms, reformulating-or simply reinterpreting-them in ways intended to make their continued participation in the arrangement somewhat less burdensome than it would otherwise be. It is for this reason, I suggest, rather than out of the (narrowly construed) efficiency considerations emphasized by previous scholars, that the contractual terms embodied in many of today's regional and multilateral institutions take the more flexible forms they do. 
Extending the Logic
That's not the end of the story, though, since the most flexible arrangements would be ones in which each party could interpret the rules however it wished. Indeed, dropping the costs of compliance to zero-by, say, making it possible for signatories to renegotiate the terms of a treaty from the ground up-would provide the enacting coalition with the greatest protection against its regime's would-be destroyers. At the same time, however, this would come at the price of completely eliminating the benefits that accrue to members of the enacting coalition itself.
In fact, the enacting coalition would not need to pay this price. In most cases, simply moderating the costs of participation should suffice. For over time, there is a natural tendency for all cooperative arrangements to develop new bases of support. 23 In the absence of major interventions, however, constituency building typically proceeds rather slowly, occurring over decades rather than years or months. This, of course, poses something of a problem for the prime movers, who would like their new institutional creation to be surrounded as quickly as possible with a broad-based, everexpanding coalition of supporters. Given the immediacy of their concerns, the prime movers would surely want to pursue every available means of expediting this "natural" constituency-building process.
One way of doing this would be to deliberately hold down the initial costs of the new arrangement, preventing the bulk of the costs from kicking in until after the dust has settled and 22 Although government turnover is the internal threat upon which I have been focusing thus far, within-government preference shifts are certainly also possible (see, e.g., Stokes 1999) . Like the threat of government turnover, then, the possibility of radical policy U-turns is something a new regime's creators would presumably want to take into account. 23 As, for example, the GATT generated a constituency among export producers. See, e.g., Destler and Odell 1987. expectations have begun to adjust. With this in mind, new treaties could be designed to take effect gradually rather than all at once. 24 The prime movers could also make use of the bully pulpit, launching an aggressive publicity campaign directly linking their regime to principles and values embraced by their societies and, even better, by the global financial community. Here, too, the purpose would be to enlarge the pool of potential stakeholders, thereby tempering the destructive zeal of regime opponents who might one day be in a position to subvert the new cooperative status quo.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the enacting coalition could make a special effort to hasten the launch of its new organizational creation, particularly if the enactors had reason to believe their dominant positions would be short-lived. There would certainly be costs to hasty action, as, indeed, there would be costs to all the insulation devices discussed here. Setting an early date for passage and ratification of a new treaty would mean limiting the amount of time available for scrutinizing alternative proposals, and hence for allowing the enactors to determine exactly which scheme would stand the best chance of advancing their interests. These costs, however, would need to be set against the benefit to the prime movers of getting something "out there" as quickly as possible, even if that something did not accord quite as closely with their underlying preferences as another institutional arrangement that might have been chosen. The sooner their new structure was up and running, the sooner would citizens, interest groups, and members of the global financial community begin developing a vested interest in its perpetuation-and the greater, therefore, its prospects of withstanding a future decline in the enacting coalition's power. 24 Trade agreements often take this form, with allowances for step-by-step implementation and phased-in concessions granted to especially sensitive sectors or even whole countries.
Power Politics and Institutional Variation
If my analysis to this point is correct, we should not be surprised to find multilateral regimes being designed and engineered by a small subset of their founding members-the ones who were initially, if only temporarily, the most powerful. Might these actors' interests in "congealing" their distinctive preferences influence the types of cooperative arrangements they create, predisposing them toward more elaborate-and more flexible-supranational structures than they would otherwise prefer?
25 This, I have argued, is exactly what one ought to expect.
Not that considerations of this kind would always be germane, of course. Nor, even when they were germane, would they necessarily dominate the kinds of motivations and incentives that institutionalist scholars are used to discussing. Even if the fragility of the enactors' new regime and the prospect that they might one day lose control of it did weigh heavily in their minds, the opportunism and coordination problems emphasized by previous scholars could weigh even more heavily. There is certainly no reason to assume that because power-politics considerations are salient in a particular case, other considerations must therefore be irrelevant. My point is simply that the new institutionalism's theoretical equation may be missing, or at least has neglected, a very important set of explanatory variables. But these omitted variables-whether the enacting governments' cooperative agenda is well-or poorly-received by their domestic opponents "back home," whether the political parties representing these opponents stand a realistic chance of assuming office in the near future, and so on-are variables, not constants. Indeed, it would be shocking if their values and relative salience did not vary from case to case or across different historical periods. After all, the "threat" of domestic political turnover may not be as threatening in the case of security regimes, where the preferences of outgoing and incoming elites are less likely to 25 The term "congealing" is borrowed from Riker 1980, 445. diverge substantially, as in the case of economic or environmental regimes, where sharp partisan divisions are the norm in most democracies. And even where there are major disparities between the preferences of a state's current power holders and their domestic opponents, the extent to which these disparities posed a threat to the power holders in question would be contingent on, among other things, their countries' systems of government: the more democratic are their domestic political institutions, the more threatened are these incumbents likely to feel, and hence (all else being equal) the more likely they are to endow their new regimes with an incomplete, more malleable set of provisions.
To be sure, some incompleteness is unavoidable. Not every contingency can be covered, and even the most carefully worded agreements may be subject to differing interpretations. In much of the institutionalist literature, however, these ambiguities are treated as an unfortunate (albeit inescapable) fact of life, the only question being how, by devising governance structures of various kinds, the contracting parties might successfully mitigate their adverse consequences. Yet suppose that the architects of a new multilateral regime have reason to believe that their current (relatively powerful) positions will be short-lived, and that their partners-perhaps even their own domestic successors-will soon find themselves in a position to dismantle the new cooperative arrangement and replace it with one more to their liking. Under these circumstances, the actors who are spearheading the initiative are likely to favor an agreement characterized by greater ambiguity and incompleteness. For though it might be possible for them to craft a more finely-grained set of provisions-even, in fact, if doing so would be easy, requiring little more than the addition of a few simple clarifications-the inflexibility and comprehensiveness of the resulting agreement would deny the prime movers' opponents a readily available means of limiting the new regime's damaging impact.
It is true that by failing to resolve the ambiguities in their agreement ex ante, the prime movers would be opening the door to greater opportunism-that is to say, more cheating-ex post.
And yet, as long as the stream of benefits (relative to the available alternatives) was sufficiently large, it is unclear that many members of the collectivity would find it in their interests to misbehave.
While no one would dispute that many cooperative arrangements are vulnerable to free riding, the real problem is that these so-called benefit streams, though conducive to the welfare of the enacting coalition, may inflict untold damage on their domestic successors (as well as other regime losers), in which case the latter will want not just to "defect" from the arrangement but, conceivably, to destroy it altogether.
Why Did the European Monetary System Take the Form It Did?
Is there a power politics of institutional design and, if so, how might its internal logic differ from that of other institutionalist arguments more familiar to students of international relations?
Having provided some of the analytical groundwork necessary for answering these questions, I want now to supplement this theoretical discussion with a brief analysis of one of the most important developments in the history of regional monetary relations: the inauguration of the EMS in 1979 and its transformation into the monetary union we see today.
26 26 Much of the terrain I will be covering in this section is new, for, as voluminous as it is, the literature on European monetary unification has thus far paid relatively little attention to questions concerning institutional design and (especially) variation. This is particularly true of research on Europe's transition from the Snake regime of the early 1970s to the EMS of the 1980s; indeed, a number of analysts dispute that the institutional structures of these two monetary arrangements differed in any meaningful way, except perhaps for the fact that the EMS afforded the Italian lira wider margins than it had enjoyed under the Snake (Frieden 1994, 27; McNamara 1998, 32 ; see also Oatley 1997) . What these accounts overlook-and it is not a trivial oversight-is the fact that parity realignments under the EMS were (1) possible and (2) subject to the consent of a higher-level collective decision-making body, neither of which was the case under the Snake.
A First Cut
If the analyses offered by Ludlow (1982) 
and others are correct, sometime around 1977 the two prime movers behind the EMS-President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in France and Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt in Germany-developed a mutual interest in stabilizing the franc-mark exchange rate. 27 The fact that both leaders stood to benefit from a Franco-German exchange rate agreement did not mean that such an agreement would be struck, however, or, if struck, that it would necessarily be adhered to. Looking at the situation from the standpoint of France, some analysts have suggested that Giscard's optimal strategy would have been to uphold such an agreement until-but only until-the inflationary expectations of French workers had begun to adjust to (what they perceived as) the new "franc fort" reality. 28 Under standard assumptions (e.g., nominal wage contracts could not easily be renegotiated in the short term), a franc devaluation at that point would have permitted Giscard's supporters to enjoy the benefits associated with an undervalued currencyincreased demand for French exports, faster output growth, and the like-without at the same time having to endure the higher rates of wage inflation normally produced by a depreciating currency.
There would also be a downside, however. By breaking his promise with Schmidt, Giscard would have signaled to the French public that his future pronouncements, whether on economic policy or any other matter, were not to be trusted. Making matters worse, a "surprise" devaluation in France would have exacerbated inflationary pressures in Germany, no doubt prompting a retaliatory response from authorities at Germany's central bank (with whom Giscard and Schmidt were both involved in a repeated game). By provoking a Bundesbank-engineered economic slowdown in Germany, Giscard's defection might well have ended up dampening, not stimulating, foreign demand for French exports.
Following this line of reasoning, one could conclude that exchange rate coordination among (sufficiently farsighted) European governments was not really so difficult to achieve after all. Given that beggar-thy-neighbor exchange rate policies offered no lasting advantage to the would-be defector (France)-and they certainly did not benefit the exploited party (Germany)-a FrancoGerman exchange rate agreement would have been self-enforcing. By this logic, however, a simple treaty should have sufficed. Why, then, did the French and German architects of the EMS go to the trouble of establishing a quasi-legislative supranational governance structure?
Recall that for cooperation to emerge within the context of an iterated PD, each player has to believe that a defection in the current round of the game will be met with retaliation in some future round (or rounds). 29 In practice, however, this condition is likely to hold only insofar as the players are familiar with the histories of their current partners. Thus one could argue that all of the European governments that participated in the EMS negotiations had an interest in prespecifying, as clearly and precisely as possible, the standards by which their future behavior would be judged.
Drafting the EMS treaty was itself, in this view, a kind of "cooperative device." 30 Though necessary, however, it was not sufficient, for the EMS charter was sure to be incomplete. Without a well-developed body of rules for dealing with unforeseen contingencies and special circumstances not specifically covered by the treaty-the onset of a recession in one member country but not in any of the others, for example-there would be nothing to stop each EMS signatory from interpreting the treaty differently, creating a crisis that could lead to a breakdown of the entire system.
To address this problem, the founders of the EMS could have stipulated that all disputes concerning matters of treaty interpretation be settled through open-ended intergovernmental negotiations. This is not, however, what the founders did. Instead, they specifically required that all such disputes be adjudicated by "a common procedure" (Article 3.2). The effect of this provision was to take these disagreements out of the hands of individual member governments and transfer them to a higher collective decision-making structure. Which structure? The one the founders had in mind was the European Monetary Committee, a permanent body made up of the deputy governors from the central banks of each EMS signatory, senior representatives from member countries' finance ministries, and two representatives of the European Commission. Once the EMS charter came into force, this body assumed responsibility for determining whether prevailing economic conditions warranted a readjustment of exchange rates and, if so, which EMS signatories would be permitted to devalue and by how much.
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The fact that EMS signatories were willing to adhere to a predesignated set of collective decision-making procedures has been described as "a revolutionary development [touching] at the very heart of monetary sovereignty." 32 What inspired this dramatic departure from past practice?
The answer given above-a straightforward application of new institutionalist reasoning-may seem incontrovertible. Surely the actors who designed the EMS could anticipate that a simple exchange rate agreement would not be fine-grained enough to cover all possible contingencies and that, in all 31 Technically, of course, an EMS member state whose request for a devaluation was denied by the European Monetary Committee could go ahead and devalue anyway; the committee's decisions were authoritative only insofar as national governments chose to honor them. Refusing to comply, however, would have meant exiting the system and thus forgoing any benefits of participation or (of greater salience to governing officials in Italy and the UK) incurring the costs of exclusion. Either way, it was an extremely risky move, and one that for well over a decade EMS member governments were loath to undertake. 32 Tsoukalis 1989, 63. likelihood, signatories of the regime would use the resulting ambiguities (particularly during periods of crisis and instability) as a pretext for driving down the value of their currencies. Indeed, it was precisely to prevent this sort of thing from happening-or so, as suggested above, one might plausibly argue-that the "principals" who drafted the treaty decided to empower a higher-level "agent." Had it not been for the expectations-clarifying role of the European Monetary Committee, many of the regime's signatories would have taken every opportunity to free ride (knowing they could do so without patently violating the letter of the original treaty) and, wracked by compliance problems, the EMS would have met an early death.
A Closer Look
As superficially compelling as it is, this line of analysis suffers from at least two serious weaknesses. The first is that it views the designing of the EMS as a collective endeavor when, as Ludlow's account makes clear, it was dictated by two individuals-the president of France and the chancellor of Germany. To be sure, the fact that Giscard and Schmidt did not go out of their way to consult their European counterparts would not have mattered if their European partners had held similar preferences. But in Italy and the United Kingdom, at least, these partners did not hold similar preferences. In fact, governing elites in Italy and the UK were decidedly unenthusiastic about the EMS, a regime whose creation they did not initially support and to which they consented only after France and Germany's go-it-alone capabilities rendered it a fait accompli.
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Granting that Giscard's and Schmidt's institutional preferences counted for a lot more than those of their counterparts in Italy or Britain, how well does the previous analysis do in explaining 33 As it was, Britain did not enter the regime until 1990, and even then its government did so with considerable ambivalence. See Moravcsik 1998, 417-28; Thatcher 1993, chap. 24 . For the Italian perspective, see De Cecco 1989; Frieden 1994; Gruber 2000, chap. 8; and Spaventa 1980. the former? Were the two EMS enactors as intent on lowering the ambiguity and information barriers to successful collective action as the above account implies? Perhaps, though this requires us to believe that the regime's French and German sponsors were just waiting for the right opportunity to defect from their initial agreement. In fact-and this is the second big problem with the "first cut" new institutionalist account I have just been elaborating-there was little for either leader to gain by double-crossing the other.
Take the German chancellor. With the Bundesbank maintaining its tightfisted control over Germany's money supply, it would have been pointless for Schmidt even to try to deviate from the path of low inflation. For thus provoked, the Bundesbank would have been only too quick to raise German interest rates, as, indeed, it had done in 1973, the last time a German government had tried to enact a large fiscal stimulus. As for Giscard, his free-rider incentives were only slightly greaterhe was, after all, a conservative. It's true that in 1976 his administration had been moved to withdraw the franc from the Snake, the forerunner to the EMS in which France had been (intermittently) participating since 1972. By the end of 1976, however, Giscard had come to appreciate the limitations of franc depreciation as a strategy for stimulating economic growth. 34 As long as French workers remained unwilling to moderate their wage demands-a safe bet given the militancy of France's labor movement and anti-labor orientation of the government-a continuously depreciating franc would have exacerbated the very inflation problem that Giscard and his newlyappointed prime minister, Raymond Barre, had been working so urgently to redress.
But this raises an interesting question: Given how averse they both were to inflation, why didn't the regime's French and German prime movers draft a more complete, Snake-like agreement explicitly prohibiting the signatories of "their" regime from devaluing their currencies? It is certainly not that Giscard and Schmidt were incapable of doing so. And, indeed, had they endowed the EMS with a tighter, less flexible set of rules, they could have avoided many of the "realignment uncertainty" problems that were to surface later on, fueling unwarranted speculation and instability within the financial markets. 35 These potential gains notwithstanding, however, the architects of the EMS opted for a more open-ended institutional arrangement. The question is why.
A Power-Politics Perspective
Drawing on my earlier inquiry into the power politics of institutional design, I would argue that an important impetus for their decision was their expectation that one day soon their own power would wane and a new political actor-including, quite possibly, an EMS "loser"-would emerge to take their place. To be sure, Germany's involvement in the EMS was at little risk of being terminated by a future German government. 36 In France, however, Giscard's low-inflation, tightmoney orientation was anything but secure. Even before the outbreak of the second oil crisis in 1978-79, many observers were skeptical that the conservative president would be able to fend off his Socialist challenger, François Mitterrand, in the next presidential election.
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Were Mitterrand to succeed in capturing the presidency, his natural inclination would be to end France's participation in the EMS. In so doing, he would of course be forgoing any credibility bonus he might have enjoyed by virtue of continuing to link the (weak) franc to the (strong) D-mark.
On the other hand, Mitterrand shared the view of most other Socialist leaders at that time that the costs of obtaining this bonus far exceeded any potential benefits. Nor was this view entirely without foundation. Given the left's well-known aversion to austerity, it was safe to assume that the transitional phase during which inflationary expectations in France converged to those in Germany would extend over several years, if not decades, during which thousands of French workers would be forced out of their jobs. Thus, it is hardly surprising that France's two left-wing parties failed to support the EMS initiative when it was first proposed in 1977. Had these parties captured a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections held the following year (as pre-election polls predicted they would), it is quite likely that that Giscard's proposal would have been rejectedperhaps resoundingly so-in which case the European Monetary System might never have seen the light of day.
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It is true that critics of the EMS could also be found in other countries-most notably, again, in Italy and the UK. 39 Yet only in France did opponents of the regime have the potential to single-handedly bring about its demise. Had President Mitterrand decided to pull the franc from the system, as he very nearly did in the early 1980s (see below), the Italian lira and British pound would have been certain to follow, and the regime would have effectively ceased to exist. Nor was this scenario only of concern to the regime's supporters in France; the possibility of a French pullout was also a source of acute concern to the regime's sponsors in Germany, many of whom feared that a future return to a system of freely floating exchange rates would cause the deutsche mark to appreciate rapidly against the franc (as well as any other European currency that had formerly 38 Ludlow 1982, 85. 39 Gruber 2000, chap. 8. pegged to the D-mark), thus forcing up the price of German-produced goods and services in some of Germany's leading export markets.
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As they set about designing their new cooperative framework, Giscard and Schmidt thus had to take particular care not to load it down with rigid, Snake-like rules and structures that France's left-wing opposition parties would be only too quick to abandon if, as seemed increasingly likely, they were one day to gain control of the French presidency, the National Assembly, or both.
Although there would be some loss in terms of disciplining inflation, a looser institutional structure would have the virtue of extending their new arrangement's lease on life. Hence the view shared by governing officials in both France and Germany-and embraced (not surprisingly) by their counterparts from Italy and the UK-that "however strict the system might eventually become, flexibility, and more particularly provisions for changes in exchange rates, would have to be written into the arrangement from the beginning."
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But while the EMS afforded its member states a degree of flexibility not enjoyed by signatories of the Snake, its institutional structure was not-because it did not need to be-so malleable as to permit a newly-empowered Socialist administration to escape the need for austerity altogether. Rather than permit each member state to decide for itself whether it was deserving of special dispensation, Giscard and Schmidt transferred authority over all EMS realignment requests to a collective decision-making body, the aforementioned European Monetary Committee, whose decisions were meant to be arrived at by consensus. There was, then, no guarantee that a member 40 These concerns are discussed in De Cecco 1989; Gruber 2000, chap. 8; and Heisenberg 1999, 51-53. 41 Ludlow 1982, 159 ; see also Padoa-Schioppa 1986. Had it not been for their fear of provoking West Germany's powerful central bank (whose president was initially inclined toward the status quo), the evidence suggests that President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt would have introduced even greater flexibility into the regime than they did. See Kaltenthaler 1998, chap. 3. state's devaluation request would be granted. As we will see, the EMS opponents of greatest concern to the regime's two architects did not fare as poorly under the arrangement as they might have under a newly-reconstituted Snake. But though the French Socialists (wisely) refrained from withdrawing the franc from the system, in the end the deck remained firmly stacked against them.
Institutional Engineering and the Co-optation of the French Socialists: The System Worked
In 1981, Mitterrand achieved his long-awaited victory. During his first eighteen months in office-a period known as the Socialist experiment-he radically overhauled the French economy, increasing welfare provision, nationalizing strategic industries, introducing a minimum wage, and guaranteeing workers the right to collective bargaining. But because many of these policies were inflationary, they put severe downward pressure on the franc, making it difficult for the new president to continue upholding the exchange rate commitments that he had inherited from his predecessor. Mitterrand was thus confronted with a choice between (1) continuing the Socialist experiment or (2) maintaining France's commitments under the EMS.
In late 1982, the president abruptly terminated the experiment, replacing his administration's earlier reforms with a succession of stringent austerity programs. This raises an obvious question:
Why didn't Mitterrand destroy the EMS when he had the chance?
The prevailing view is that he left the franc in the EMS because he feared a pullout would shatter the global financial community's confidence in his administration's ability to manage the currency. Evidence to the contrary is suggested by the experience of the earlier Snake regime, whose membership varied dramatically over its six years of existence. In its first year alone, the UK, Ireland, and Italy all dropped out of the system, their leaders' fears of provoking the financial markets apparently notwithstanding. As for France, it dropped out on two separate occasions, first in 1974 and then (after Giscard reintroduced the franc at a more competitive exchange rate the following year) in 1976. In each of these withdrawals, the reputational costs of exiting the system were deemed insufficiently large to justify the signatory's continuing participation. This lesson was not lost on the architects of the EMS.
If the economic straitjacket imposed by France's involvement in the EMS had been as tight as the earlier straitjacket imposed by the Snake regime of the mid-1970s, no one would have been particularly surprised had Mitterrand gone ahead and withdrawn the franc from the system. As it was, however, the new monetary system had been specifically engineered to reduce the costs it imposed on its more inflation-prone member governments. Thus, for example, the French franc was Taken together, these realignments reduced the value of the franc by more than 25 percent. 43 And yet in all of the research that has been done on Mitterrand's EMS "non-decision," the regime's provisions for exchange rate adjustments have received only passing notice. Nor have other institutional features of the regime, such as its more accommodating provisions (relative to the Snake) for financial assistance, been accorded the explanatory role they deserve. 44 While Mitterrand may never have been particularly fond of the EMS-and, had he been standing in Giscard's shoes in 1978, would almost certainly not have allowed it to come into existence-there is little question that the regime's in-built flexibility made his life "on the inside" considerably less onerous than it might have been. 45 If not for this flexibility, things might have turned out very differently indeed.
Changing Money: From the EMS to a Common Currency
The EMS treaty's elevation of exchange-rate changes into matters for collective decision making and adjudication was to utterly transform European monetary relations over the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the 1999 debut of the euro, Europe's long-awaited common currency. But 43 As large as they were, these devaluations were still too small to compensate entirely for the inflation differentials that had accumulated between France and Germany over this period. See Fratianni and von Hagen 1992, 29, table 2.4. 44 EMS signatories provided the French with generous loans through the system's mediumterm financing facility, thus further defraying the costs of Mitterrand's post-experiment stabilization policies. 45 Of course, some might argue that the reason the new French administration felt it could live with the EMS had less to do with the regime's institutional structure than with the absence of any (sustainable) left-wing alternative to the right's policy of fiscal and monetary contraction; cf. Woolley 1992. On the other hand, neither Mitterrand nor his economic advisers seemed aware of these constraints at the time. Quite the contrary, the individuals who entered office in 1981 believed the rest of the world was on the verge of economic recovery-in which case a newly-primed French economy would have been well-positioned to satisfy the sudden burst in global demand (Hall 1986, 196) . And even after it had become clear that this surge in demand would not be forthcoming, a number of Mitterrand's closest advisers continued to insist that France's balance of trade difficulties could still be redressed without austerity, so long as the government pursued the "alternative strategy" of cutting loose from the EMS. See esp. Cameron 1989. while this new currency can be seen as an outgrowth of the EMS and the bold, if not "revolutionary" (Tsoukalis 1989, 63) , transformation it brought about, there are important differences between the terms and institutions of Europe's new monetary union and those of the older regime it has now supplanted.
Of particular interest, for present purposes, are the new regime's more restrictive provisions concerning parity realignments. Realignments are illegal, the new rules stipulate, now, always, and forever. This is quite a departure from the EMS, whose explicit allowances for parity readjustments made for what was, in many ways, a more forgiving monetary regime.
It is true that EMS realignments were always conditional upon the approval of the European Monetary Committee. As a result, the earlier regime was not entirely forgiving. Nor, for that matter, is Europe's current monetary regime entirely rigid and inflexible. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the expansionist-minded leaders who presided over France's economy during the early 1980s were to reclaim their positions at the helm of the French government today, after France has already committed itself to EMU. In theory, a new left-wing French government hell-bent on stimulating aggregate demand could still use its influence in the Governing Council of the new European Central Bank (ECB) to seek a reduction in European interest rates. 46 In practice, however, France's central bank governor would get to cast but one vote on the Governing Council, and the ECB's six-member Executive Board (without whose support it would be difficult to gain the necessary majority) would probably not be very receptive to French proposals calling for a dramatic expansion in the European money supply. In short, the adoption of the euro as France's national 46 There is in fact a second, albeit less direct, avenue for mitigating the disciplining effects of membership in the new monetary union: a member government could try to get the European Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN), which controls the euro's exchange rate, to drive down its value relative to other, non-EMU currencies.
currency has removed what was once a major-and, for those on the French left, a politically invaluable-source of monetary flexibility. While the signatories of EMU continue to engage in collective decision making, one of the key issues over which their EMS predecessors used to deliberate-namely, whether an adjustment in a newly-disadvantaged member government's exchange rate parities might be warranted as a means of preserving the integrity of the system-has now been taken off the table. Might the logic of institutional design elaborated in this paper help us make sense of any of this? Why did the architects of EMU think they could "get away" with a simpler, less accommodating monetary structure?
Perhaps it was because they did not see any die-hard, anti-EMU opponents looming on the political horizon. By this logic, the French government's coming to terms with fixed exchange rates and tight money-a begrudging acceptance that began in 1983, as we have seen, and increased steadily thereafter-was of decisive importance. 47 To be sure, the EMU initiative did meet with strong criticism from French politicians on both the left and the right. But with the exceptions of the country's Communist party (which viewed the euro as an anti-inflationary sell-out to the interests of global capitalism) and the far right (whose champion, Jean-Marie Le Pen, regarded the euro as an unacceptable surrender of national sovereignty), the target of France's anti-EMU backlash was less the single-currency regime itself than the deficit-cutting measures that the French government was required to undertake in order to qualify for membership in the first wave of joiners. In Germany, meanwhile, the idea of moving to a single currency was strongly and consistently embraced by Chancellor Kohl. And though many German citizens viewed the idea with suspicion, party leaders across Germany's political spectrum came out in favor of it anyway.
48 47 For further analysis of Mitterrand's (belated) embrace of monetary union, see Moravcsik 1998, 404-17. 48 There are a number of reasons for this. One is that the country's political elites viewed Here, then, is a parsimonious explanation for the monetary union's relatively restrictive institutional framework. Why was this framework acceptable to the French and German governments in the late 1990s but not the late 1970s? The answer is that this time around (in contrast with the earlier EMS experience) the Franco-German enactors encountered no internal opposition-or at least none with any realistic prospect of wielding political power. Consequently, the pivotal players behind the EMU initiative did not feel the same need to soften their regime, as Giscard and Schmidt had softened theirs, in hopes of discouraging their successors from disrupting the regime at some point in the future.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to lay out the core elements of a broader, more nuanced theory of institutional design. This broader perspective shares the neoliberal premise that (some) international institutions really do "matter," in the sense of playing a more-than-trivial role in sustaining long-term cooperation among self-interested states. It also recognizes the importance of grounding the study of institutions, even epiphenomenal ones, in rational choice foundations. Yet whereas many of our existing institutionalist models view the institution building process as a collective endeavor, the reality-and the starting point for the power-politics model sketched out here-is that some participants in this process often wield disproportionate influence over the final outcome. While everyone in the collectivity may be taken into account to some degree, there is no reason to suppose that everyone will be taken into account to the same degree. The preferences expressed by those collectivity members who are the least unhappy with the non-cooperative status quo-or who (like the symbolism surrounding the passage and ratification of EMU as a means of reassuring Germany's European neighbors, as well as the United States, that "unification would not be the harbinger of a bellicose remilitarization" (Garrett 1994, 58) . See also Kaltenthaler 1998, chap. 5. Giscard and Schmidt in the case of the EMS) have the capacity to remove that status quo from the set of feasible alternatives-will almost certainly carry greater weight. That being the case, I have suggested that we focus our analytical attention on the distinctive problems and dilemmas confronting these pivotal actors.
And, indeed, logic suggests that the kinds of problems and dilemmas confronting these more powerful actors would be distinctive. Of particular concern to this pivotal sub-group of cooperators-the members of the enacting coalition-would be the emergence within "their" new cooperative arrangement of new actors who dislike it (at least in its present configuration) and who might even want to destroy it. For though the prime movers who make up the enacting coalition fully expect to benefit from the regimes they establish, those same regimes may not look so beneficial to the officials who assume office after the enactors themselves have left the political stage.
The fact that a cooperative regime need not be conducive to the interests of all of its members presents the original coalition of beneficiaries with a particularly challenging institutional design task. Why? Because now, rather than merely deterring opportunists or establishing focal points, the institutions devised by the "winners" must also reduce the natural inclination of their enemies to sabotage their cooperative structures (or redirect them toward very different purposes) should they, the "losers," ever find themselves in a position to do so.
Which kinds of cooperative arrangements and institutions would meet these criteria? The answer offered here is straightforward: The kinds of regimes most likely to survive the coming to power of one (or more) of the losers are those that explicitly allow for subsequent revisions in the initial rules of the game, albeit with the proviso that these be determined not unilaterally, with each member government deciding for itself how to interpret the relevant articles or provisions, but supranationally-which is to say, by delegating the matter to a pre-designated third party or (as in the case of the EMS) through negotiations that take place in accordance with a well-defined set of collective decision-making principles and procedures. Insofar as supranational regimes of this kind are becoming more prevalent, it is primarily, I have argued, because the winners who engineer them believe that their more accommodating structures will have the effect of mitigating the losers' destructive zeal (by providing formal channels for the collective resolution of disputes, etc.) while still allowing the enactors themselves to secure enough gains to make the enterprise worth their while.
